

LIMITED OFFICIAL USETechnology Transfer Risks

The sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia does not constitute a high risk due to loss of technology. AWACS' major components are of 1960s design: the radar (pulse doppler) is textbook technology, and the computer is commercially available.

The computer software, which integrates the radar and the computer, is advanced. However, unscrambling the system software is difficult and would be only marginally beneficial, since it could be re-programmed in a matter of days. Throughout the operating life of the AWACS, US technical support personnel will remain essential to the maintenance of the software system. Without continuous US contractor maintenance, AWACS operations would be forced to shut down in a matter of days.

Another factor which reduces the potential costs of an AWACS technology transfer is the fact that the new Soviet AWACS-type aircraft, the Candid, is expected to be operational soon. DIA estimates that the Candid will have aerial surveillance capabilities comparable *Av* those of AWACS.

The governments of Saudi Arabia and the United States are developing special security arrangements to ensure protection of the AWACS and its associated equipment, and the other items in the equipment package. A joint plan is being developed to cover physical and personnel security. The plan will mandate periodic inspections, and will be approved by the US at least one year before delivery of AWACS.

Only US and Saudi Arabian nationals will be allowed to work in, support and provide security for AWACS. No third country personnel will be allowed to perform maintenance on or modifications to AWACS. Third country transfer of AWACS, its equipment, or data derived from AWACS will be prohibited by agreement of the two governments.

Compromise of AIM-9L technology could have a serious impact, even though the Soviets are believed to have a missile in development that will give them an AIM-9L class capability in the near future. However, the sale of the AIM-9L to Saudi Arabia will have the same stringent safeguards to protect the security of the technology. The AIM-9L already has been released to NATO and Israel.

Not referred to OSD - On file release instructions apply.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DIA review completed.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

In addition to the specific clauses of the contract between the USG and SAG, a general security of information agreement is being developed which provides specific procedures for access to and protection of classified information, periodic inspections and physical security.

Finally, because we are deleting certain sensitive systems from the Saudi version of the AWACS, the costs associated with a potential compromise are reduced still further. Specifically, Saudi AWACS will not include:

25X1

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE